CHAPTER VII
THE PROCESS OF CREATIVE DESTRUCTION

The theories of monopolistic and oligopolistic competition and their popular variants may in two ways be made to serve the view that capitalist reality is unfavorable to maximum performance in production. One may hold that it always has been so and that all along output has been expanding in spite of the secular sabotage perpetrated by the managing bourgeoisie. Advocates of this proposition would have to produce evidence to the effect that the observed rate of increase can be accounted for by a sequence of favorable circumstances unconnected with the mechanism of private enterprise and strong enough to overcome the latter’s resistance. This is precisely the question which we shall discuss in Chapter IX. However, those who espouse this variant at least avoid the trouble about historical fact that the advocates of the alternative proposition have to face. This avers that capitalist reality once tended to favor maximum productive performance, or at all events productive performance so considerable as to constitute a major element in any serious appraisal of the system; but that the later spread of monopolist structures, killing competition, has by now reversed that tendency.

First, this involves the creation of an entirely imaginary golden age of perfect competition that at some time somehow metamorphosed itself into the monopolistic age, whereas it is quite clear that perfect competition has at no time been more of a reality than it is at present. Secondly, it is necessary to point out that the rate of increase in output did not decrease from the nineties from which, I suppose, the prevalence of the largest-size concerns, at least in manufacturing industry, would have to be dated; that there is nothing in the behavior of the time series of total output to suggest a “break in trend”; and, most important of all, that the modern standard of life of the masses evolved during the period of relatively unfettered “big business.” If we list the items that enter the modern workman’s budget and from 1899 on observe the course of their prices not in terms of money but in terms of the hours of labor that will buy them—i.e., each year’s money prices divided by each year’s hourly wage rates—we cannot fail to be struck by the rate of the advance which, considering the spectacular improvement in qualities, seems to have been greater and not smaller than it ever was before. If we economists were given less to wishful thinking and more to
the observation of facts, doubts would immediately arise as to the realistic virtues of a theory that would have led us to expect a very different result. Nor is this all. As soon as we go into details and inquire into the individual items in which progress was most conspicuous, the trail leads not to the doors of those firms that work under conditions of comparatively free competition but precisely to the doors of the large concerns—which, as in the case of agricultural machinery, also account for much of the progress in the competitive sector—and a shocking suspicion dawns upon us that big business may have had more to do with creating that standard of life than with keeping it down.

The conclusions alluded to at the end of the preceding chapter are in fact almost completely false. Yet they follow from observations and theorems that are almost completely true. Both economists and popular writers have once more run away with some fragments of reality they happened to grasp. These fragments themselves were mostly seen correctly. Their formal properties were mostly developed correctly. But no conclusions about capitalist reality as a whole follow from such fragmentary analyses. If we draw them nevertheless, we can be right only by accident. That has been done. And the lucky accident did not happen.

The essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process. It may seem strange that anyone can fail to see so obvious a fact which moreover was long ago emphasized by Karl Marx. Yet that fragmentary analysis which yields the bulk of our propositions about the functioning of modern capitalism persistently neglects it. Let us restate the point and see how it bears upon our problem.

Capitalism, then, is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary. And this evolutionary character of the capitalist process is not merely due to the fact that economic life goes on in a social and natural environment which changes and by its change alters the data of economic action; this fact is important and these changes (wars, revolutions and so on) often condition industrial change, but they are not its prime movers. Nor is this evolutionary character due to a quasi-automatic increase in population and capital or to the vagaries of monetary systems of which exactly the same thing holds true. The fundamental

1 As a matter of fact, those observations and theorems are not completely satisfactory. The usual expositions of the doctrine of imperfect competition fail in particular to give due attention to the many and important cases in which, even as a matter of static theory, imperfect competition approximates the results of perfect competition. There are other cases in which it does not do this, but offers compensations which, while not entering any output index, yet contribute to what the output index is in the last resort intended to measure—the cases in which a firm defends its market by establishing a name for quality and service for instance. However, in order to simplify matters, we will not take issue with that doctrine on its own ground.
impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the
new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the
new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist
enterprise creates.

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the contents of the laborer’s
budget, say from 1760 to 1940, did not simply grow on unchanging lines
but they underwent a process of qualitative change. Similarly, the history
of the productive apparatus of a typical farm, from the beginnings of the
rationalization of crop rotation, plowing and fattening to the mechanized
thing of today—linking up with elevators and railroads—is a history of
revolutions. So is the history of the productive apparatus of the iron and
steel industry from the charcoal furnace to our own type of furnace, or the
history of the apparatus of power production from the overshot water wheel
to the modern power plant, or the history of transportation from the
mailcoach to the airplane. The opening up of new markets, foreign or
domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop and
factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of
industrial mutation—if I may use that biological term—that incessantly
revolutionizes\textsuperscript{2} the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying
the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative
Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism
consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in. This fact
bears upon our problem in two ways.

First, since we are dealing with a process whose every element takes
considerable time in revealing its true features and ultimate effects, there is
no point in appraising the performance of that process \textit{ex visu} of a given
point of time; we must judge its performance over time, as it unfolds through
decades or centuries. A system—any system, economic or other—that at
every given point of time fully utilizes its possibilities to the best advantage
may yet in the long run be inferior to a system that does so at \textit{no} given point
of time, because the latter’s failure to do so may be a condition for the level
or speed of long-run performance.

Second, since we are dealing with an organic process, analysis of what
happens in any particular part of it—say, in an individual concern or
industry—may indeed clarify details of mechanism but is inconclusive
beyond that. Every piece of business strategy acquires its true significance
only against the background of that process and within the situation created

\textsuperscript{2} Those revolutions are not strictly incessant; they occur in discrete rushes which are
separated from each other by spans of comparative quiet. The process as a whole works
incessantly however, in the sense that there always is either revolution or absorption of the
results of revolution, both together forming what are known as business cycles.
by it. It must be seen in its role in the perennial gale of creative destruction; it cannot be understood irrespective of it or, in fact, on the hypothesis that there is a perennial lull.

But economists who, *ex visu* of a point of time, look for example at the behavior of an oligopolist industry—an industry which consists of a few big firms—and observe the well-known moves and countermoves within it that seem to aim at nothing but high prices and restrictions of output are making precisely that hypothesis. They accept the data of the momentary situation as if there were no past or future to it and think that they have understood what there is to understand if they interpret the behavior of those firms by means of the principle of maximizing profits with reference to those data. The usual theorist’s paper and the usual government commission’s report practically never try to see that behavior, on the one hand, as a result of a piece of past history and, on the other hand, as an attempt to deal with a situation that is sure to change presently—as an attempt by those firms to keep on their feet, on ground that is slipping away from under them. In other words, the problem that is usually being visualized is how capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the relevant problem is how it creates and destroys them. As long as this is not recognized, the investigator does a meaningless job. As soon as it is recognized, his outlook on capitalist practice and its social results changes considerably.3

The first thing to go is the traditional conception of the *modus operandi* of competition. Economists are at long last emerging from the stage in which price competition was all they saw. As soon as quality competition and sales effort are admitted into the sacred precincts of theory, the price variable is ousted from its dominant position. However, it is still competition within a rigid pattern of invariant conditions, methods of production and forms of industrial organization in particular, that practically monopolizes attention. But in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not that kind of competition which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization (the largest-scale unit of control for instance)—competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as much more effective than the other as a bombardment is in comparison with forcing a

3 It should be understood that it is only our appraisal of economic performance and not our moral judgment that can be so changed. Owing to its autonomy, moral approval or disapproval is entirely independent of our appraisal of social (or any other) results, unless we happen to adopt a moral system such as utilitarianism which makes moral approval and disapproval turn on them *ex definitions*. 
door, and so much more important that it becomes a matter of comparative
difference whether competition in the ordinary sense functions more or less
promptly; the powerful lever that in the long run expands output and brings
down prices is in any case made of other stuff.

It is hardly necessary to point out that competition of the kind we now
have in mind acts not only when in being but also when it is merely an ever-
present threat. It disciplines before it attacks. The businessman feels himself
to be in a competitive situation even if he is alone in his field or if, though
not alone, he holds a position such that investigating government experts fail
to see any effective competition between him and any other firms in the same
or a neighboring field and in consequence conclude that his talk, under
examination, about his competitive sorrows is all make-believe. In many
cases, though not in all, this will in the long run enforce behavior very
similar to the perfectly competitive pattern.

Many theorists take the opposite view which is best conveyed by an
example. Let us assume that there is a certain number of retailers in a
neighborhood who try to improve their relative position by service and
“atmosphere” but avoid price competition and stick as to methods to the local
tradition—a picture of stagnating routine. As others drift into the trade that
quasi-equilibrium is indeed upset, but in a manner that does not benefit their
customers. The economic space around each of the shops having been
narrowed, their owners will no longer be able to make a living and they will
try to mend the case by raising prices in tacit agreement. This will further
reduce their sales and so, by successive pyramiding, a situation will evolve
in which increasing potential supply will be attended by increasing instead
of decreasing prices and by decreasing instead of increasing sales.

Such cases do occur, and it is right and proper to work them out. But as
the practical instances usually given show, they are fringe-end cases to be
found mainly in the sectors furthest removed from all that is most
characteristic of capitalist activity. Moreover, they are transient by nature.
In the case of retail trade the competition that matters arises not from
additional shops of the same type, but from the department store, the chain
store, the mail-order house and the supermarket which are bound to destroy
those pyramids sooner or later.4

4 This is also shown by a theorem we frequently meet with in expositions of the theory of
imperfect competition, viz., the theorem that, under conditions of imperfect competition,
producing or trading businesses tend to be irrationally small. Since imperfect competition is at
the same time held to be an outstanding characteristic of modern industry we are set to
wondering what world these theorists live in, unless, as stated above, fringe-end cases are all
they have in mind.

5 The mere threat of their attack cannot, in the particular conditions, environmental and
personal, of small-scale retail trade, have its usual disciplining influence, for the small man is
too much hampered by his cost structure and, however well he may manage within his
Now a theoretical construction which neglects this essential element of the case neglects all that is most typically capitalist about it; even if correct in logic as well as in fact, it is like *Hamlet* without the Danish prince.

inescapable limitations, he can never adapt himself to the methods of competitors who can afford to sell at the price at which he buys.